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March 20, 1992


An Asia Watch Report


A Division of Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch                         Human Rights Watch

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© 1991 by Human Rights Watch

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The Asia Watch Committee was established in 1985 to monitor and promote in Asia observance of internationally recognized human rights. The chair is Jack Greenberg and the vice-chairs arc Harriet Rabb and Orville Schell. Sidney Jones is Executive Director. Mike Jendrzcjczyk is Washington Director. Patricia Gossman and Robin Munro are Research Associates. Jcannine Guthrie and Vicki Shu are Associates. Dinah PoKempner and Mickey Spiegel is a Consultant.



Human Rights Watch is composed of five Watch Committees: Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch and Middle East Watch.


Executive Committee

Robert L. Bernstein, Chair; Adrian DeWind, Vice-Chair; Roland Algrant. Lisa Anderson, Peter Bell, Alice Brown, William Carmichael, Dorothy Cullman, Irene Diamond, Jonathan Fanton,Jack Greenberg, Alice H. Henkin, Stephen L. Kass, Marina P. Kaufman, Jeri Laber, Arych Neier, Bruce Rabb, Harriet Rabb, Kenneth Roth, Orville Schell, Gary Sick, Robert Wedgeworth.


Aryeh Neier, Executive Director; Kenneth Roth, Deputy Director; Holly Burkhalter, Washington Director; Ellen Lutz, California Director; Susan Osnos, Press Director; Jemera Rone, Counsel; Stephanie Steele, Operations Director; Dorothy Q. Thomas, Women's Rights Project Director; Joanna Weschler, Prison Project Director.


Executive Directors


Africa Watch         Americas Watch         Asia Watch

Rakiya Omaar        Juan Mendei            Sidney Jones


Helsinki Watch       Middle East Watch     Fund for Free Expression

Jeri Laber           Andrew Whitley        Gara LaMarche





Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1


Update on the 1991 crackdown and new cases of concern .......................  ................. 2


Why the Crackdown? ................................................................................................. 5


Appendices ................................................................................................................ 8

I. Report on Human Rights Conditions in Inner Mongolia (II) ................... 8

II. On Further Stabilizing the Minority Areas in the Frontier Regions:

the Situation and our Views ............................................................... 14

III. Circular on Matters Needing Attention of Citizens in Their

Contacts with Foreign Nationals in the Open

Cities and Areas of Our Region ......................................................... 19

IV. Urgent Circular on the Management and Reception

of Uninvited Groups or Groups to be Invited but Already

Arriving from [Outer] Mongolia ......................................................... 22

V. Previously Reported Cases of Concern ............................................. 24

VI. Labor Camps, Prisons and other Detention

Units in Inner Mongolia ..................................................................... 26


Errata for Crackdown in Inner Mongolia ................................................................ 34





1.      Bao'an zhao Labor-Reform Detachment

2.      Baotou Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center

3.      Bayannur League Labor-Reform Farm

4.      Baiyun E'bo Mining District (certain units)

5.      Chifeng Labor-Reform Detachment

6.      Chifeng Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center

7.      Chifeng New Life Tile Factory

8.      Chifeng Precious Stones Quarry

9.      Fengzhen Labor-Reeducation Center

10.  Dongtucheng Farm

11.  Hailar Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center

12.  Harqin Banner Precioue Stones Mine

13.  Hohhot Railways Bureau Remand Center

14.  Hohhot Railways Bureau Labor-Reeducation Brigade

15.  Inner Mongolia Prison

16.  Inner Mongolia Regional Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 Labor-Reform Detachments

17.  Inner Mongolia Regional No.4 Labor-Reform Detachment

18.  Inner Mongolia Regional Nos.6 and 7 Labor-Reform Detachment

19.  Inner Mongolia Regional Juvenile Offenders Center

20.  Jining Labor-Reeducation Center

21.  LiJiata Coal Mine

22.  Linhe Municipal Detention Center

23.  New Life Brickyard

24.  New Life Machinery Factory

25.  Tumd Right Banner New Life Coal Mine

26.  Tumd Right Banner New Life Farm

27.  Tumuji Labor-Reeducation Center

28.  Wuhai Labor-Reeducation Center

29.  Wulan Farm

30.  Labor-Reform Bureau of the IMAR





In early May 1991, the Chinese authorities launched a secret campaign of repression against ethnic Mongolian intellectuals in China's third largest administrative area, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). In July 1991, Asia Watch published a preliminary report on the repression, entitled Crackdown in Inner Mongolia. That report included our translation of Document No.13, a top-secret Communist Party directive explaining and ordering the crackdown; the text of an urgent appeal issued from the IMAR in late May by an underground group called the Inner Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights (Neimenggu Baowei Renquan Tongmeng); and, byway of background, extracts from a secret Party document of August 1981 which assessed the appalling damage and suffering inflicted upon ethnic Mongolians in the region during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).

The present report provides an update on the ongoing repression against peaceful dissenters in Inner Mongolia over the past six months and summarizes other related developments in the region. It also contains the text of a second appeal document issued by the Mongolian underground group mentioned above, together with further confidential documents issued by the Party in 1990 and 1991 detailing its policies toward ethnic minorities and setting forth restrictions on access between inhabitants of the IMAR and foreigners - in particular, Mongolians from the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic [MPR]. In addition, the report lists details of all the known prisons and forced labor camps in the IMAR.

The campaign of repression began in May 1991 with the crushing of two small private study groups - called the IhJu League National Culture Society and the Bayannur League National Modernization Society - which had been formed over the previous year or so by like-minded Mongolian intellectuals and Party cadres in an attempt to regenerate the region's long- suppressed Mongolian ethnic and cultural identity.1 The groups operated openly and with the full knowledge of senior local officials and had even applied for legal registration. According to Document No.13, issued on May 11, 1991, however, the two groups “used the discussion of ‘national culture’ and ‘national modernization’. . . to oppose the leadership of the Communist Party and the socialist system, and to incite a national split and undermine the unification of the motherland.”

The first arrests came swiftly. On the night of May 15, 1991, two young Mongolians named Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai,2 both leaders of the Ih Ju League National Culture Society and employees of the league's Bureau of Education, were seized by security agents at their homes in Dongsheng, the local capital, and 26 other key members of the society were placed under house arrest.3 At the time, nothing was known concerning the fate of those active in the group based in Bayannur League, a more remote pan of the IMAR and one largely closed to foreigners.4 Document No.13 had characterized this group as being more politically radical than the Ih Ju group, however, and it seemed likely that particularly stern measures would be taken against its organizers. Besides these ethnic Mongolian activists, a number of student and worker demonstrators are also known to have been arrested in Inner Mongolia after the June 1989 nationwide crackdown on the pro-democracy movement. Those still believed to be imprisoned there include Tasu, Wang Shufeng and Qian Shitun, all leaders or members of the Autonomous Federation of Students from Outside Beijing; Bao Huilin, Cai Shi, Wen Lihua, Yang Xudong and Zhang Lishan, leaders of the Hohhot Workers Autonomous Federation; and Zhao Guoliang. a self-employed garment vendor. (See Appendix V for details.)


Update on the 1991 crackdown and new cases of concern


On June 30, 1991, a second appeal statement, bearing the signature of an ethnicMongolian named Burghud (Bu-er-gu-te in Chinese) was issued by the underground Inner Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights (see below for full text). Nothing is known about Burghud, and the name may well be pseudonymous. Burghud’s appeal statement summarized as follows the severe crackdown operation undertaken by the regional security authorities in the wake of the May 1991 arrests:

After the events of IhJu and Bayannur Leagues, Wang Qun [Party Secretary of the IMAR] became convinced that there are also "illegal organizations" and "national splittist elements" in the other six leagues and four municipalities directly under the autonomous region. Therefore, at the same time as he sent public security and state security agents to IhJu and Bayannur Leagues, he also deployed secret police in Hohhot, the capital city of Inner Mongolia, and the other leagues and municipalities....They are acting in the utmost secrecy...

In order to step up the repression, the Beijing authorities have transferred large numbers of experienced public security and state security agents from Beijing, Hebei and Shanxi to Inner Mongolia...More and more people are being secretly questioned, watched and followed. An increasing number of students, teachers, cadres and workers are becoming suspects. Some high-ranking ethnic Mongolian officials have also become targets of investigation. Panic and unease are spreading.

According to sources, the authorities have expanded their investigations to ethnic Mongolian college students studying in universities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous region and in Gansu, Liaoning and Henan Provinces. These students are or soon will be facing persecution.5

On specific cases, the appeal statement reported that one Bayantogtokh,6 a secondary school teacher and leader of the Bayannur League National Modernization Society, had some time earlier been seized by the authorities, together with seven other key members of the group, and taken to Linhe, the league's capital. Bayantogtokh was said to have later been secretly tried (length of unknown), and there was no further information on the fate of his seven colleagues.

Concerning the IhJu League National Culture Society, the statement reported that Wang Manglai, 30, and Huchuntegus, 36, had been placed under so-called “shelter and investigation” (an unregulated form of police administrative detention which can mean almost indefinite incarceration without trial), and transferred to a secret prison in Hohhot, the regional capital. The prison was said to be administered by Section 5 of the IMAR Public Security Bureau and to be designed to hold major political prisoners, Huchuntegus1 wife, Dabushlatu, was reportedly being subjected to constant official harassment and persecution, and neither she nor Wang Manglai’s wife had been informed of their husbands’ place of detention or allowed to visit them.

Burghud added that the 26 members of the group earlier placed under house arrest had since been repeatedly interrogated by the police and subjected to insults, intimidation and physical abuse, and that eight of them - including one Sechenbayar, a researcher at the In Ju League's Ghengis Khan Research Center - would soon be placed under formal arrest. A “mandatory study campaign” had been launched throughout the league, moreover, in the aim of forcing the local population to “repudiate and expose” the group’s alleged “crimes of national splittism and bourgeois liberalization.”

Another recent case of great concern is that of Ulan Chovo, 37, reportedly a professor of history at the University of Inner Mongolia.7 Asia Waich has received three separate reports indicating that Ulan Chovo was arrested sometime after the May 1991 crackdown (probably on July 11) and charged with passing confidential documents to foreigners. According to one report, he had been secretly tape-recorded and photographed doing so. According to another report, which came direct from ethnic Mongolian sources in Hohhot, Ulan Chovo was recently tried in secret and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

The documents in question were almost certainly the first appeal statement by the Inner Mongolian league for the Defense of Human Rights and the IMAR Party Committee’s Document No.13. In September 1991, a journalist named Andrew Higgins, Beijing-based correspondent for the British Independent newspaper, was detained and searched at a Chinese airport and found to be in possession of these documents, the contents of which he had filed a report on to his newspaper some days earlier. Higgins was subsequently expelled from the country.8 As noted above, Asia Watch, which had obtained the documents by an entirely separate channel, in July 1991 published both documents in full translation. While neither Higgins nor Asia Watch obtained the documents from Ulan Chovo, it is clear that the Chinese authorities regarded the publication abroad of these documents as being a major embarrassment, and it is likely that no efforts were spared - including even the use of physical torture - to track down the source of the leak and obtain a confession. A photograph of Ulan Chovo, obtained from dissident Inner Mongolian sources living abroad, is included below.

Another case cited in the June 1991 appeal by the Inner Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights concerns a journalism sophomore named Zhang Haiquan, an ethnic Mongolian, who was arrested shortly after June 4, 1991 (the second anniversary of the 1989 Beijing massacre) in connection with “reactionary slogans” - including “Long live democracy” and “Long live the Guomindang” - which had appeared on a classroom blackboard at the University of Inner Mongolia. Nothing further has since been heard of Zhang Haiquan.

Other ethnic Mongolian dissidents known to be imprisoned in Inner Mongolia on account of their peaceful political beliefs include a man named Bater, 35, formerly an official in the government planning commission of Xilin Gol League, and Bao Hongguang, also 35, an engineer. Both men were leaders of a large-scale student protest movement against Han domination of the IMAR that had rocked the region in 1981. In the summer of 1987, following official persecution, Bao and Bater escaped across the border to the Mongolian People’s Republic and sought political asylum there, but were subsequently extradited back to China and each sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. Their current place and conditions of detention are not known.

In early 1992, scattered evidence of major incidents of social unrest having occurred in recent months began to trickle out from Inner Mongolia. According to the February 1992 issue of the Hong Kong magazine Dongxiang (“Trends”), for example, large-scale protest demonstrations in support of Inner Mongolian independence took place in no less than six key cities in the region -Jining, Hailar, Tongliao. Xilinhot, Linhe and Erenhot - between November 1991 and January 1992. According to the report, more than 20 people were injured in Tongliao on November 6 when demonstrating herdsmen exchanged gunfire with PLA troops sent in to quell the protest.9 In early February 1992, Asia Watch received a broadly similar report from a Western traveller who had returned from the region in late January. According to the source, large and sometimes violent protest demonstrations had occurred in Bailar, Jining, Erenhot and Xilinhot in recent weeks. Calls for reunification with the MPR had been raised and a number of workers and others had been arrested.


Why the Crackdown?


The continuing crackdown by Beijing against ethnic and political dissent in the IMAR reflects the central authorities' intense current concern over two separate but related issues: incipient nationalist tendencies among the country's ethnic minorities, and the broader nationwide trend toward democracy which was abruptly suppressed on June 4, 1989. Concerning the two Mongolian study groups in Ih Ju and Bayannur Leagues, the Party's top-secret Document No.13 specifically noted: “It is clear that our struggle against these illegal organizations is in fact the continuation of our struggle against bourgeois liberalism. It is the concrete expression of the struggle between subversion and anti-subversion, infiltration and anti-infiltration, peaceful evolution and anti-peaceful evolution in our region.”

More recently, Wang Qun, Party secretary of the IMAR, has denounced alleged Western interference in the region and urged Inner Mongolians to "build up a great wall of steel against ‘peaceful evolution.’” According to Wang, “At present, hostile international forces have gone all out to carry out ‘peaceful evolution’ against China. Their habitual practices include imposing economic sanctions, stirring up trouble among the masses, and engaging in sabotage under the guise of ‘nationality,’ ‘religion,’ ‘democracy,’ and ‘human rights.’”10

The real threat to BeiJing’s power in the IMAR seems, however, to lie much closer to home. As Party General-Secretary Jiang Zemin pointed out, in a confidential keynote speech of March 1990 entitled “On Further Stabilizing the Minority Areas in the Frontier Regions” (see below for full text):

The "Democratic League" and other opposition groups in the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] claim to have the support of their "Mongolian brothers and sisters" within China's borders. There are some in the MPR who are vainly trying to establish a so-called Greater Mongolian State that would include the Buryat (ethnic Mongolian) Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union and also our Inner Mongolia. The slogans used by the reactionary elements within and outside both Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang are extremely similar -for example, “No nuclear testing,” “Against the plunder of our resources” and “Drive away the outsiders.”

For several days in October 1991, a group of Mongolian students (apparently all from the MPR) staged a rare sit-in protest in sub-zero temperatures outside the Chinese Embassy in Ulan Bator calling for an end to the repression in Inner Mongolia. The group handed embassy officials a letter to Premier Li Peng calling for the release of six imprisoned Inner Mongolian dissidents and two of China's most famous pro-democracy figures. “We want the release of the eight prisoners, an end to Chinese human rights abuses in Inner Mongolia and a stop to the Chinese policy of assimilating our Inner Mongolian brothers,” said one of the protestors, a student at Mongolian State University named Dashdorj Rensentavhai. A notice board set up by the students carried photographs of them burning the Chinese flag and a cloth effigy of a Chinese policeman, and their banner read “Stop Communist Repression in Inner Mongolia.”11

The charge of separatism and attempting “to split the motherland” has long been leveled by Beijing against the pro-independence movement in Tibet. The IMAR, however, is effectively pan of a divided nation, and this adds a new and potentially explosive element to the Inner Mongolian question (and also that of Xinjiang) that is not found in the case of Tibet. The arrival in 1990 of democratic reforms and the establishment of a multi-party system in the neighbouring Mongolian People’s Republic (now renamed the State of Mongolia) seem clearly to have intensified the sense of discontentment felt by many ethnic Inner Mongolians within the context of this divided nationhood.12 As the documents presented here and in Asia Watch's previous report on Inner Mongolia indicate, moreover, sections of the emergent dissident movement there do appear to incline, albeit quite peacefully, toward the idea of some kind of eventual Mongolian reunification.

What is certain is that recent world events, starting with the Romanian revolution and culminating in the reconstitution of the former Soviet Asian republics as independent states, have served to raise the Chinese leadership’s anxieties about such matters to virtual fever pitch. In the speech cited above, Jiang Zemin went so far as to warn darkly: “Some people are vainly searching for a ‘Timisoara’ in China’s ethnic minority regions.” Given Beijing's current siege mentality on the issue of political opposition, international scrutiny of the human rights situation in Inner Mongolia and other ethnic-minority regions of the People’s Republic is henceforth likely to become ever more urgent and necessary.

In the meantime, Asia Watch calls upon the Chinese Government immediately and unconditionally to release Huchuntegus, Wang Manglai, Bayantogtokh, Bater, Bao Hongguang, Ulan Chovo, Wang Shufeng, Qian Shitun, Bao Huilin, Cai Shi, Wen Uhua, Yang Xudong, Zhang Lishan, Zhang Haiquan, Tasu, Zhao Guoliang and all others currently imprisoned in the IMAR on account of their peaceful political beliefs and activities. A list of known political detainees in Mongolia is attached as Appendix V.



 Appendix I


Report on Human Rights Conditions in Inner Mongolia (II)

By Burghud of the

Inner Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights

June 30, 1991


According to disclosures by a public security agent of Inner Mongolia, after the illegal arrests of Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai [leaders of the outlawed “Ih Ju League National Culture Society” ] on May 15 on the pretext of taking them in for “shelter and investigation” (shourong shencha), they were secretly sent under escort from the Municipality of Dongsheng in Ih Ju League to Baotou. Recently, they were moved again, this time to Hohhot, and are being held in a secret Jail administered by Section 5 of the Public Security Bureau of Inner Mongolia. That jail is used by the authorities to hold the “most dangerous” political prisoners. Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai have been held incommunicado ever since they were arrested. Their families are not allowed to visit them. They do not even know where their loved ones are being held.

Dabushlatu, wife of Huchuntegus, is an accountant working for the Nationalities Bazaar in the Municipality of Dongsheng. She is 32, and they have a boy of six. She has constantly been harassed, watched and followed since her husband's arrest. She has been illegally questioned many times by the police, and her personal freedom is being restricted. The authorities forbade her to travel and ordered the management of the bazaar to report her words and deeds regularly to the police. Instigated by the authorities, some people even directly threatened Dabushlatu's personal safety. On one occasion, when she was talking in the Mongolian language with someone at her place of work, she was upbraided and told to shut up by an ethnic Han colleague. Dabushlatu has lost touch with her husband and is being subjected to all kinds of pressure. She is being spiritually tortured and she has no idea when her travail will end.

Wang Manglai's wife is an editor working for the local television station in Ih Ju League. They have two children; the younger one is still in its infancy. Her husband’s arrest by the police deeply traumatized her. She cannot even find a nanny to look after her children so that she could go to work. She has spent the month and a half in agony, fear and helplessness. She only wishes to know where her husband is being held and when she could see him, if only for a moment. But no one knows how long Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai will be kept in prison.

As for the fate of Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai, people have fears that an open and fair trial is almost out of the question. This is because the authorities really cannot produce any evidence to show that the defendants violated any Chinese laws that are in force. According to document number 13 of 1991 issued by the Office of Inner Mongolia Communist Party Committee, their "crime" consists primarily of the following three points:


1. having founded an illegal organization;

2. having worked to split the nationalities and propagated bourgeois-liberal ideas;

3. having illegally printed and distributed a political tract published in the Mongolian

People’s Republic.


But none of these three charges are tenable.

First, Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai initiated the founding of the Ih Ju League National Cultural Society in September 1990. Since then, they have repeatedly applied to register with the proper authorities in accordance with the procedures laid down by the authorities. They were told that that was the time for re-registering the existing organizations and that new organizations would have to wait. It was under those circumstances that they formed the preparatory group for the founding of the society at the suggestion of the propaganda department of the Ih Ju League communist party committee. Document No.13 of the Inner Mongolia Communist Party committee accuses them of “trying in vain to gain legal status.” But it is stipulated in explicit terms in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China that people enjoy the freedom of association. We would like to know if the Inner Mongolia Communist Party means to accuse this particular stipulation in the Chinese Constitution drawn up under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Secondly, six scholarly lectures were organized and Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai wrote four or five articles after the preparatory group was formed. All these activities had the approval of the local authorities concerned. The articles were also sent to the concerned officials to look over. There is nothing in them that violates the law or “attacks” the Chinese communist party or government. Yet, the authorities hold that in his "Letter to Mr. X"13 (In Mongolian) Huchuntegus “incited nationalist sentiments and created national splits, and vilified” communist cadres. In the introduction to his article “The Past, Present and Future of Mongolian Culture,” Wang Manglai discussed three adverse influences suffered by Mongolian culture since the Ching (Manchu) Dynasty, the latest being the impact of the “red culture.” This was accused by the authorities as “anti-communist party and anti-socialist system,” and an “attempt” to overthrow the leadership of the communist party." What this amounts to is obvious: “If you are out to condemn somebody, you can always trump up a charge,” as the Chinese saying goes.

Thirdly, in 1990, a book entitled On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century14 was published in Ulan Bator, Outer Mongolia. In order to acquaint the members of the proposed society with the thoughts and aspirations of fellow Mongolians in Outer Mongolia and the problems the latter are facing, the preparatory group of the society translated that book into archaic Mongolian, typed and mimeographed scores of copies at its own expense for members of the society to be passed on to one another among themselves. This was considered by the authorities as evidence of “hostile international forces” trying to “infiltrate and influence Inner Mongolia.” But at the same time, books that are far more tendentious than the one in question in advocating “liberalism” and “peaceful evolution” are readily available at bookstores all over China. To cite just one example, former president Richard Nixon's 1991: Winning Without War (in Chinese translation). Original and pirate editions from Hong Kong and Taiwan are also openly sold in mainland China. All kinds of “reference materials for internal use” and “printed and distributed for internal use” as well as “materials,” “conference proceedings,” etc. put out by various organizations and units are literally everywhere. Many of them reflect Western point of view and advocate “bourgeois liberalization.” Yet these are not considered by the authorities as propagating liberalization and negating communist party leadership. Only Mongolians who did the same thing are languishing in prison.

In fact, the Chinese authorities use a double standard in handling political problems on different nationalities. The Mongolians do not enjoy equal political rights as the Han people. In China, the political persecution of minority nationalities is more severe and the latter’s human rights conditions are worse. Any word or deed that upholds ethnic interests or show dissatisfaction with the status quo would be labeled by the authorities as “creating national splits” or “undermining the unification of the motherland and the unity of nationalities.” And such charges can be trumped up at will according to the needs of the authorities.


The fate of the other members of the society:


Personal freedom of the other 26 members of the society has been restricted by the authorities since the arrest of Huchun and Manglai. They are not allowed to move around a will or associate with other people. They were repeatedly questioned and intimidated by the local party and government offices and the secret police of the public security and national security bureaus. Some of them have been summoned and questioned a dozen times. On one occasion, Sechenbayar a member of the society and a research fellow at the Ih Ju League Genghis Khan Institute, was questioned by the police continuously for 12 hours from 4 p.m. on June 12 to 6 a.m. the following morning. During these questioning sessions, the police illegally used intimidation, insults and corporal punishment, trying to force or trap them into a confession. They were ordered to sit still with their hands on their knees and motionless for long stretches. The police also threatened them not to talk about their experience with the police. The authorities indicated that some of the 26 members will also be arrested, most probably eight of the more active ones.

The party organizations and administrative leadership of the places of work of these members of the society have received orders to put pressure on them, to perform “ideological work” and persuade them to voluntarily “confess” their “crimes” to the authorities. As members are constantly subjected to persecution, their families are also under tremendous mental pressure. Some are suffering from serious insomnia. Others are extremely nervous, even exhibiting certain symptoms of nervous breakdown.

This is not all. The Ih Ju League authorities, under orders of the Inner Mongolia communist party committee, are launching a mandatory study campaign throughout all banners of the league and the Municipality of Dongsheng. Party and government cadres, intellectuals, workers and students are called on to identify themselves with Document No.13 issued by the Inner Mongolia communist party committee, repudiate and expose the crimes of national splittism and bourgeois liberalization. It is not clear as of now how long that campaign will last.

* During the pro-democracy movement of 1989 in Beijing, there were also large-scale demonstrations and students boycotted classes in Hohhot, Baotou and other Inner Mongolian cities. After “June 4,” the authorities also cracked down on the participants of the pro-democracy movement. Wang Qun, secretary of the Inner Mongolia communist party committee, was one of the local leaders who advocated suppression most vehemently and the first “prince” to come out in support of the June 4 massacre. He is also remembered as the first of the party secretaries of the various provinces and autonomous regions to cable his respect to Deng Xiaoping and the other “proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation,” who ordered the Beijing massacre. But Wang Qun’s barefaced flattery and boot-licking did not win him the appreciation of the “veteran revolutionaries.” Instead, he became a laughingstock of the common people. In the past two years, the 20 million Mongolian and Han people in Inner Mongolia became familiar with the way Wang Qun appears on television, with his arms akimbo or waving in the air and shouting at the top of his voice. Especially when he abuses “bourgeois liberalization” and the “national splittists.” he glares and his eyeballs bulge. Those are indeed his outstanding characteristic features.

Around June 4 of last year and this year, posters were put up and handbills distributed in Hohhot and other Inner Mongolian cities, commemorating June 4, demanding democracy and human rights and opposing national oppression and discrimination. The authorities were frightened. They sent many plainclothes secret police and agents to university campuses. Many teachers and students were watched and followed. “Reactionary slogans” were discovered on the blackboard in a classroom of the Mongolian language department of the University of Inner Mongolia around June 4 of 1991. They read “Long live democracy” and “Long live the Kuomingtang.” More than forty students who used that classroom were questioned by police one by one. Several days later, the police arrested Zhang Haiquan (an ethnic Mongolian), a journalism sophomore. It is not known where he is being held.

* According to reliable information, after the arrest of Bayantogtokh, leader of the Bayannur League of National Modernization Society, which was branded an illegal organization by the authorities, he was secretly tried and sent to Hohhot. He is also being held in the prison administered by Section 5 of the Public Security Bureau of Inner Mongolia- Seven members of that society were escorted by the police to the Municipality of Linhe and questioned there. Their whereabouts are not known.

* The fact that the crackdown in Inner Mongolia has attracted the attention of the international community has greatly encouraged the people of Inner Mongolia. On May 12 and 14, many people said they heard the Chinese language program of the BBC, which reported on events in Inner Mongolia. VOA also reported those events on June 21. Others reported that news stories of those events appeared in the Hong Kong Times (XianggangShibao),Ming Bao and a newspaper in Taiwan. They are looking forward to learning more from those sources.

* The disclosure of what happened in Inner Mongolia by foreign media angered Beijing and Inner Mongolia authorities. They considered it a serious political matter. According to the Hong Kong Times, the Chinese authorities are convinced that a human rights organization is active in Inner Mongolia. They have ordered the public security and national security departments to crack the human rights organization case as soon as possible.

In addition, the authorities are tightly blocking the passage of the information about recent events in Inner Mongolia. The Inner Mongolia communist party committee has ordered the recall of the top secret Document Number 13 of 1991 issued by its office to the various units.

Recently, a BBC correspondent called the Ih Ju League Department of Education about the arrest of Huchuntegus and others, the person who answered the phone found out the caller was a correspondent and he reported to the leadership. It was announced at a meeting of government employees [MS not clear here] that no information about Huchuntegus and Wang Manglai could be disclosed to anyone.

* After the events in IhJu and Bayannur Leagues, Wang Qun became convinced that there are also “illegal organizations” and “national splittist elements" in the other six leagues and four municipalities directly under the autonomous region. Therefore, as he sent large numbers of public security and national security agents to IhJu and Bayannur Leagues, he also deployed secret police in Hohhot, the capital city of Inner Mongolia, and other leagues and municipalities to make sure that more “illegal organizations” will be unearthed.

According to reliable information, a task force of some thirty people was set up headed by Li Maolin, Director of the Public Security Bureau of Inner Mongolia, to unearth the “illegal organizations.” It is empowered to muster the entire police force of Inner Mongolia. And it is made up of police officers of the ranks of section and department chiefs or above, who are considered absolutely trustworthy by the authorities. They are acting in utmost secrecy.

The authorities in Beijing have been following development in Inner Mongolia over the past months with great interest. Jiang Zemin. Li Peng and Qiao Shi have all given instructions on the work in Inner Mongolia. In order to step up the suppression, the Beijing authorities have transferred large numbers of experienced public security and national security agents from Beijing, Hebei and Shanxi to Inner Mongolia. The Ministry of Public Security has also sent trouble-shooters to assume command there.

The authorities are enlarging the scope of their investigations and persecution. More and more people are being secretly questioned, watched and followed. An increasing number of students, teachers, care and workers are becoming suspects. Some high-ranking ethnic Mongolian officials have also become targets of investigations. Panic and unease are spreading. According to some sources, the authorities have expanded their investigations to ethnic Mongolian college students studying in universities in the Xianjiang Uigher Autonomous Region and Gansu, Liaoning and Henan provinces. These students are or will soon be facing persecution.

* The Second Convention of the Inner Mongolian Association of Philosophy and the Social Sciences was held May 10-12. Wang Qun and Bu He, president of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, attended the convention. Wang Qun twice interrupted presentations by professors and in a harsh tone demanded if they knew an illegal organization had been unearthed in Ih Ju League. He then lectured them, claiming that academic issues were in fact political issues, and that the domestic and international class enemies were using academic research to split the nation and undermine the unity of the motherland. He repeatedly stressed that one of the four ways domestic and international enemies carried out their “peaceful evolution” and subversive activities was to recruit agents from among the high-ranking party and government leaders. That comment gave high-ranking ethnic Mongolian officials the jitters. It also aroused resentment and disgust among ethnic Mongolian intellectuals and cadres. Even Han intellectuals were angered by those comments.

* The policy of the Beijing authorities toward Inner Mongolia became harsher over the past few months. In addition to political and economic measures that were inimical to ethnic Mongolians, the authorities have also taken action in education.

At the end of 1990, Guo Fuchang. director of the Department of Education for Minorities of the State Education Commission, jointly with Bai Ying and Jin Daping, respectively head and deputy-head of the Inner Mongolian Department of Education, proposed at the Conference on Education Work in Inner Mongolia that, beginning with first graders, the study of the Han (Chinese) language would be mandatory for all pupils of the ethnic Mongolian primary and middle schools, that hereafter, minority education in Inner Mongolia would be conducted as much as possible in the Chinese language, and that fewer special Fields of study and fewer students would be taught in the Mongolian language at the universities.

The “All Inner Mongolian Conference on the Teaching of Minority Languages in Primary and Middle Schools” was convened by the Inner Mongolian Department of Education in Kulun Banner of jirem League on June 10-15. At that conference, the above instructions were communicated to conference participants. Those instructions were strongly opposed by some sixty educators who attended the conference. These participants held that the instructions were tantamount to compulsory sinicization of the Mongolian nation and total destruction of Mongolian culture and education.

In fact, the new policy of the State Education Commission and the Inner Mongolian Department of Education met with strong opposition from the ethnic Mongolians at its inception. Last spring, ethnic Mongolian teachers of Jerim League collectively wrote a letter to Jiang Zemin to protest the policy. They warned that the implementation of that policy would trigger large-scale protests and demonstrations in Inner Mongolia. This matter has now become the focus of attention of the ethnic Mongolian cultural and educational circles throughout Inner Mongolia.

(end of report)


 Appendix II


On Further Stabilizing the Minority Areas in the Frontier Regions:

the Situation and our Views


byJiang Zemin

March 10. 1990



Today, we invite comrades from minority areas in the frontier regions as well as those from the greater military areas of Shenyang. Beijing, Lanzhou and Chengdu, who are attending the current plenary session of the central committee, to a forum. At the same time, we have also invited those comrades from the various departments of the central committee and the relevant ministries of the state council attending the plenary session to take part in a discussion of the problem of further stabilizing the situation in minority areas in the frontier regions. Premier Li Peng, comrades Qiao Shi and Song Ping and comrades Ding Guangen and Yang Baibing are all attending today's session. This shows that the central committee of the party, the state council and the military commission of the central committee are all following with great interest and attach great importance to the work in minority areas in the frontier regions.

At this plenary session of the central committee, we are going to make an important decision to strengthen the link between the party and the people, to carry forward the fine tradition of the mass line. For work in minority areas in the frontier regions to be successful and to maintain stability of the situation on the frontiers, we must also unswervingly unite with and rely on people of every ethnic group, on military-civilian unity, and together build a solid and civilized frontier defense, making it truly impregnable.

A short while ago, comrades Song Hanliang, Bu He and Hu Jintao talked about the situation in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet respectively, and offered some good experiences and opinions. In what follows, I will speak on the situation and our opinion on further stabilizing the situation in minority areas in the frontier regions.

I.                    Looking at the situation as a whole, our frontier regions are stable.     

In the present international and domestic climate, our minority areas in the frontier regions are able to maintain stability primarily because, in my opinion, of the following factors:

(1)    Over the long course of history, our various ethnic groups have formed a unified multi-national state. In the past century and more, in particular, people of all ethnic groups suffered from invasion, bullying, oppression and exploitation at the hand of the powers. In their struggles against foreign domination, the force that holds the various ethnic groups together, the centripetal force, has become greatly strengthened, and the “Chinese nation” has become the common name shared by all who are in the same boat and who go through thick and thin together.

(2)    Proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation have drawn up a whole set of policies toward the minorities that integrates the Marxist-Leninist nationalities theory with the reality of China’s nationalities and fits China's actual conditions. These policies have manifested specific Chinese features in the following three ways: first, the principle of equality for all ethnic groups irrespective of their size. At a meeting of the central committee in 1953, Chairman Mao, in summing up, made it clear that “it is all right to make scientific analysis. But politically we should avoid distinguishing among a nationality, an ethnic group, or a tribe.” In accordance with this instruction, the party and government determined that all stable communities of people living in China are to be called “nationalities” irrespective of the size of their population or territory, the stage of their social development, or whether the main body

of their population lives within China's borders, provided they share distinctive features in economic life, spoken and written language, costume, customs and habits and national consciousness. At that time. the state council issued a notice lo abolish or change the place names and names of nationalities left over from the old China that were insulting to the minorities. Secondly, regional autonomy of minority nationalities has become the basic institution for solving China's nationalities problem, and the slogans of “national self-determination” and “federalism” have been discarded. As early as October 23, 1945, the central committee of our party pointed out: “Our basic policy towards Inner Mongolia at the present time is to institute regional autonomy.” On February 18, 1946, the central committee pointed out further that “we demand equality and autonomy for the nationalities in accordance with the program for peaceful national construction. But we must not put forward the slogan of independence or self-determination.” On May 1, 1947, we established the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Thirdly, we have upheld the policy of unity, progress, close cooperation and mutual promotion. In 1952, the central committee issued the “Opinions in principle on the 5-year construction plan for minority areas,” which explicitly formulated the basic task of nationalities work as instituting regional autonomy for the minority nationalities, developing their economy and culture, and strengthening and consolidating national unity. In the past forty years, the cause of China's national unity and progress has achieved brilliant successes. Especially since the third plenary session of the eleventh central committee, and with the shift in the focus of our work, the minority areas and the minorities have made remarkable progress, and the basis for national unity has been expanded and strengthened.

(3)    After we suppressed the disturbances and rebellion that broke out last year in Beijing and some other cities, we strengthened our work in minority areas in the frontier regions. Last September, the state council issued its document No. 62 and called a work conference on helping the poor in the minority areas. I made a speech at that conference. In October, the central committee of the party made a special study of the Tibetan question, after which the “Summary of Minutes of the Politburo Party Committee’s Discussions at the Conference on Work in Tibet” was issued. The party committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region conscientiously communicated that document and carried out the instructions. In January and February of this year, after the central committee of the party and the state council issued a circular on changes in the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the various areas promptly studied the document and carried out the instructions. Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia convened standing committee meetings, made a special study of the work to stabilize the situation and took measures. In mid-February, the party central committee and state council heard a report of the meeting of the commissioners of the nationalities commissions of the country. I and Comrade Li Peng both spoke at the meeting. Our speeches and instructions are being transmitted and carried out. All this played an important role in maintaining stability in minority areas in the frontier regions. February 26 was the New Year of the iron horse according to the Tibetan calendar. A festive air of joy and celebrations prevailed in areas where ethnic Tibetans live in compact communities, including Lhasa. The situation in Lhasa was also stable on the 5th and 10th of March, [anniversaries of uprisings-tr.]

II.    Even as we fully affirm our achievements, we must attach great importance to eliminating all sorts of elements of instability in the frontier regions.

(1)    Splittists both within and outside of the country and other reactionary forces have never ceased their disruptive activities. The Dalai clique of Tibet, the Isa clique15 of Xinjiang and “Mongolia” of Inner Mongolia established their joint setup in Switzerland two years ago. It is publishing its organ periodical in New Delhi. Some splittists have joined force with those reactionary elements who are trying to bring about bourgeois liberalization. Some people are looking in vain for “Timisoara” in China’s minority areas. Not long ago, Dalai even went so far as to openly ask us to take the road of the Eastern European countries, and threatened to change his conciliatory stand. Splittists within and outside of Tibet have stepped up their disruptive activities. In Luolong County of Changdu area, three cases of bombing, murder and reactionary slogan took place in a single day. The “Democratic League” and other opposition groups in the Mongolian People’s Republic [MPR] claim to have the support of their “Mongolian brothers and sisters” within China’s borders. There are some in the MPR who are vainly trying to establish a so-called Greater Mongolian state that would include the Buryat (ethnic Mongolian) Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union and also our Inner Mongolia. The slogans used by the reactionary elements within and outside both Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang are extremely similar -- for example, “No nuclear testing,” “Against the plunder of our resources,” and “Drive away the outsiders.”

(2)    Compared with other areas of the hinterland, the frontier regions lag far behind in economic and cultural development. To this day, some of the minority people still do not have enough to eat and wear. Certain areas and departments are negligent of the nationalities question in their work. They apply the same formula to quite different cases. Development of resources in minority areas by the state gives a great impetus to the growth of those areas. But insufficient attention has been paid to local development and the interests of the minority people. To tackle these problems step by step, the state council has taken and is still taking the necessary measures. Work to help the poor has been very effective. But still greater efforts are needed to have the policies and measures properly implemented. Bridging the gap is a long-term tasks.

(3)    As a result of the lack of breadth and depth of the work of propaganda and education in the Marxist view and theory of nationalities and the party's policy towards the nationalities, and especially the inadequacy of the education of youngsters, part of the writers and artists and cadres, incidents that hurt the feelings of the minority people on such sensitive issues as customs and habits and religious belief still occur from time to time. There are very close links between those minority people who live in compact communities in the frontier regions and those who are scattered in the hinterland. An incident in one place rapidly impacts on another. The book on “Sexual Habits” touched off considerable commotion.16 Tens of thousands took to the streets in Urumchi and Lanzhou. They rushed the leading organs, vandalized and burned automobiles.

We take the above-mentioned problems and other elements of instability very seriously and shall tackle them in real earnest. We would rather regard the problems as more serious than they really are so as to heighten our vigilance and provide against possible trouble; we must never lower our guard.

III.   In the days to come, work in several fields must be conscientiously done well.

On the whole, provided we uphold the set of principles and policies that has stood the test of practice, closely unite with and firmly rely on people of the various nationalities and work had to perform our tasks well, we shall be able to ride out the storm, continue to maintain stability in the minority areas in the frontier regions, and steadily improve the situation there. Otherwise, rather big problems and troubles may crop up in the present climate and as a result of incitement and disruption on the pan of the hostile domestic and foreign forces.

(1)    Take a clear-cut stand in fighting divisive activities and infiltration. Those who engage in divisive activities are always in the minority. But we must maintain sharp vigilance and beware of the disruption and damage they could inflict on us, unite with and rely on the broad masses of the cadres and people and wage a resolute struggle against them. We must take the initiative to eliminate hidden danger and take effective preventive measures. At the same time, we must draw up advance plans to deal with emergencies so as to be prepared against every contingency. We must try as much as possible to nip the disruptive activities in the bud and never allow them to grow and spread. We must also be on guard against those who try to infiltrate under the cloak of religion and take preventive measures.

(2)    We must promote economic and cultural development in a down-to-earth manner. It is especially important to achieve solid economic growth, show solicitude for people’s livelihood, and solve the problem of providing adequate food and clothing for the people once for all and as quickly as possible, help them shed their poverty and become well-to-do, and advance towards prosperity for all. Those measures adopted by the state council that have proven effective must be implemented in earnest. In the days to come, our policy should further favor the poverty-stricken areas and areas of the old and the young. While stressing self-reliance, it is also necessary to give them assistance and support.

(3)    Continue to open up the minority areas in the frontier regions to the outside world, develop good-neighborly and friendly relations and border trade, as well as economic and technological cooperation. At the same time, border trade must be effectively managed, so that it can play a positive role and its negative side can be overcome and it can develop in a healthy manner.

(4)    Step up propaganda and education in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist view of nationalities, focusing on leading cadres at all levels, intellectuals and young people. Sensitive issues likely to ignite mass emotions should be promptly handled properly and with prudence. Propaganda and public opinion shaping should be conducted successfully, starting from the desire to strengthen national unity and stabilize the overall situation. For example, some minority people take exception to such formulations as “descendants of Emperors Yan and Huang” [generally regarded as the ancestors of the Han people-tr.]. We may consider using such phrases domestically as the “Chinese nation,” “sons and daughters of China,” so as to better appeal to the minorities. Again, for example, in propagating certain historical events and figures, one could learn from the spirit of the then premier Zhou Enlai, when he urged dramatists to write historical plays about “Princess Wencheng” and “Wang Zhaojun” [Chinese princess and court lady married to minority chiefs-tr.]. We must uphold the historical materialist stand, guide the people to look forward, and promote the unity among the various nationalities.

(5)    We must adopt effective measures to enforce in full the "Law of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities," and promptly enact the necessary decrees for this purpose. The key to enforcing the said law is to foster large numbers of cadres and all sorts of qualified personnel, who have both ability and political integrity. It is especially important to foster high-ranking minority cadres, who are versed in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist view of nationalities.

(6)    Step up the building of our frontier defense. The frontier guards are an important force in stabilizing the situation in the frontier regions. Effective measures must be taken to solve the problems and difficulties the frontier guards are facing. We must strengthen the joint defense of the guard units, the police and civilians, and effectively wage a struggle against infiltration and subversion, safeguard the normal order of openness to the outside world, defend the frontiers and the security of our country.

Comrades: The minority people in the frontier region love the party and socialism ardently. I personally experienced this last year, when I visited the area where the Jino people live in compact communities in Xishuangbanna Prefecture ofYunnan Province. We shall be able continuously to maintain stability in the minority areas in the frontier regions and promote all our undertakings successfully, provided we serve the people of all nationalities wholeheartedly, rally them together closely and rely on the cadres and people of the various nationalities and perform our tasks well.

(This document is issued to the provincial and army levels. In the provinces and

autonomous regions of minority areas in the frontier regions, it may be transmitted to units at the county and regimental levels. Copies may be printed as needed, but must be strictly controlled.)


Appendix III




Document of the Office of the Peopled Government

of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region

Inner/Government/Office/Issue (1991) No. 45

March 29. 1991


Circular on Matters Needing Attention of Citizens

in Their Contacts with Foreign Nationals in the Open

Cities and Areas of Our Region


To the administrative offices of the various leagues, the municipal people’s governments, the banner, county (municipal) people’s governments concerned, the various commissions, offices, departments and bureaus of the autonomous region, and the various major enterprises and institutions:

In the wake of the extensive and deepgoing development of reform and openness of our region, citizens in the cities and areas open to foreign visitors have come into increasing contact with foreign nationals. In order to ensure that the party’s foreign policy is faithfully carried out, the discipline in conducting foreign affairs is strictly observed, and the people are guided to adhere to the principles governing foreign affairs activities and contacts with foreign nationals, we list the following points of attention in accordance with the principle enunciated in recent years of tightening the control of dealings with foreign nationals. All units are expected to propagate them and educate the cadres and masses in them, and overcome existing unhealthy tendencies, so as to improve our foreign affairs work.

1.     In dealing with foreign nationals, it is necessary to work for friendship, to promote friendship with people of all countries of the world; to demonstrate ardent love for the motherland and national integrity; to uphold state and national dignity; pay attention to our national style and one's personality; be particular about one’s demeanor and bearing; be civil and polite, modest and prudent; behave with self-respect, neither supercilious nor obsequious.

2.     Treat all foreign nationals equally without discrimination, irrespective of the color of their skin, the size of their country, their rank, their customs and habits, or their religious belief. Be warm and friendly and polite, avoid favoring one and be prejudiced against another, or detesting the poor and favoring the rich. In dealing with foreign nationals, one must have a sense of propriety and consider the possible political effect. Be prudent in expressing one’s views on sensitive international domestic issues, so as to avoid unnecessary disputes or incidents in foreign affairs.

3.     In dealing with foreign nationals, one must uphold the four basic principles, oppose bourgeois liberalization and watch with vigilance the infiltration by hostile foreign forces. It is necessary consciously to implement our country’s foreign policy, uphold the “One China” principle, and oppose any attempt to create “two Chinas” or “One China One Taiwan,” and words and deeds that undermine national unity. One must safeguard the unity of the motherland, defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

4.     One must strictly keep party and state secrets, be on the alert for foreign nationals who try to pry and spy out our restricted information. Once it is discovered that foreign nationals who engage in collecting intelligence, spreading rumors, stirring up trouble or other illegal activities, it must be promptly reported to one's organization as well as the security organ of the state. Do not hint to foreign nationals that oneself or one’s children would like to go abroad. Generally speaking, foreign nationals should not be invited to one’s house. No one is allowed to get in touch or contact foreign embassies or consulates in China without authorization. Do not give one’s name and address and those of one’s home and unit to foreign nationals who are total strangers and whose background is unknown.

5.     Exchanging currencies with foreign nationals, asking them for money or gifts, or to buy on one’s behalf commodities that are in short supply, forcing them to buy things from oneself, or asking them to pass on appeals or petitions are prohibited. No one is allowed to take advantage of his (her) dealings with foreign nationals for personal gain, or engage in activities that are harmful to the interests of our country and our people.

6.     Should foreign nationals request to meet with their Chinese friends or relatives, schoolmates or colleagues, visit their homes, have dinner or stay overnight, this must be approved by the leadership of the unit where the person(s) involved work, and reported to the foreign affairs department. In the case of staying overnight, registration with the public security organ is mandatory according to the regulations.

7.     As for those foreign nationals who go straight to our grassroots units or residencies, their intention must be found out. If they want to pay a visit or collect news, they should be asked to get in touch with the local foreign affairs department through the unit that received them. Those who ignore our dissuasion and try to crash the gate must be promptly reported to the relevant department for proper handling. 

8.     In case foreign nationals ask by mail for certain information about our country, or try to locate their old acquaintances of pre-liberation days, the recipients of those letters should promptly inform the relevant departments and decide whether to supply the requested information. If the background of the letter sender is not known, or the person he is trying to locate is unfit for foreign dealings, the communications should be ignored.

9.     Do not fill out the questionnaires or forms sent by foreign nationals or institutions. Instead, these should be reported to the leadership of the unit where one works, or to the foreign affairs department in charge for study, so that the matter could be settled as it sees fit.

One may submit manuscript(s) if solicited by foreign countries. But no restricted information should be disclosed. One must not respond to those solicitations if the background of the sponsor is unknown, or the contents solicited run counter to China’s foreign policy or to China’s national conditions or the prevailing moral standards.

10.   Books, periodicals and materials sent by foreign professionals to their Chinese colleagues may be accepted if these are truly valuable reference materials. Chinese professionals may also send them our books, periodicals and materials in return. But these materials must be openly published ones. Any unpublished material must be reported to the leadership of the unit concerned, or to the department in charge for approval.

11.    Individuals who receive invitations or tickets directly mailed to them by foreign embassies in China should ask for instructions from the leadership of their units or from the foreign affairs department. No one is allowed to attend or transfer his (her) invitation or ticket to others without authorization. In case foreign nationals invite Chinese personnel to view something with all sons of tickets, they should be politely turned down.

12.    Every citizen enjoys the freedom to communicate with foreign nationals by letters. But the letters must not touch on China’s secrets. One must not send souvenirs to leaders of foreign governments without authorization, nor ask for their inscriptions or autographs, so as to avoid unnecessary troubles. Recipients may write to thank foreign nationals for letters of thanks or greetings and group pictures received.

13.    Foreign nationals may take pictures wherever they are allowed to go. Those exceptional individuals who, with malicious designs, try to get some insulting shots should be criticized and the incident reported to the departments concerned. Eye-catching notices in both Chinese and foreign languages should be put up where foreign nationals are not allowed to take pictures.

It is up to the person(s) concerned to decide whether to agree to a foreign national’s request, as a friendly gesture, to have a picture taken together with him (her). Other people should not try to interfere.

14.   Travel routes in all open areas and wherever foreign travellers are allowed to visit must be kept open. No one is allowed to block these routes.

15.    Citizens living in areas where border posts are located must observe the relevant provisions in dealing with foreign nationals.

Concrete problems arising from the implementation of this circular may be reported to the office of foreign affairs of the autonomous region.

Copies for the various departments of the communist party committee of the autonomous region, office of the standing committee of the People*s Congress, office of the Political Consultative Conference, the headquarters of the Inner Mongolian military region, the higher peopled court, the procuratorate, the various mass organizations and news organizations.

Office of the People's Government of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.


Printed and issued on April 3, 1991.

Number of copies printed: 1,000.


Appendix IV


Document of the Foreign Affairs Office

of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region


Inner/Foreign/Issue (1991) No. 26

April 17. 1991


Urgent Circular on the Management and Reception

of Uninvited Groups or Groups to be Invited but Already

Arriving from [Outer] Mongolia


TO:  The administrative offices of the various leagues, the municipal people’s governments, the various commissions, offices, departments and bureaus of the autonomous region, the Hohhot Railway Bureau, the Civil Aviation Administration, the various major factories and mines and colleges and universities:

With the normalization and steady development of relations between the governments and parties of China and Mongolia [the Peopled Republic of Mongolia], exchanges and cooperation between our region and Mongolia are increasing, interregional intercourse is also steadily rising. A situation has emerged in which exchanges involve extensive areas: they take place at many different levels and through many different channels. In 1990, 892 government functionaries (including 215 guest workers) were sent to Mongolia from our region, constituting the second largest group sent abroad from China that year. One hundred and eleven Mongolian government functionaries were invited to visit our region, representing the largest group of invited foreign visitors to China. These exchanges helped improve mutual understanding and traditional friendship between the Chinese and Mongolian peoples, and promote the growth of good-neighborly and friendly relations.

In the course of these exchanges, however, the Mongolians have become overly impatient, overly enthusiastic and overly unruly. A major manifestation of this is that an increasing number of uninvited groups are coming and groups to be invited are already arriving on their own. As far as we know, two groups with a total of 15 members were to be invited in 1989, but they came without waiting for the official invitation, and all their members were functionaries at the provincial and ministerial levels. In 1990, 15 groups, with a total of 56 members, came either uninvited or before planned invitations materialized. In 1991, there were already nine groups with 48 members so far. The sudden arrival of these groups caused certain difficulties and inconveniences in our reception work and foreign affairs management. In addition, the Mongolians often mix economic and trade exchanges with cultural ones and are keen on exchanging personal visits. The contents of certain agreements are rather confused, and this is not conducive to meaningful cooperation. We hold that the problem is primarily caused by the Mongolian side. The Autonomous Region plans to make representations to the Mongolians side through diplomatic channels and request that they correct the situation. At the same time, we too need to improve our education and strengthen our management. Otherwise, control will become still more difficult once railway service between Hohhot and Ulan Bator begins and the number of passengers increases. We have therefore enacted the following provisions for managing the visiting groups. The various areas and units are expected to act accordingly.

1.    As a matter of principle, the various areas and departments should not receive uninvited groups or individuals. In case the latter contact our relevant areas or counterpart departments directly or through their consulate general in Hohhut, the areas or departments concerned must not make commitments on their own. If they consider the contact desirable, they should send a written report to the foreign affairs office of the autonomous region. With the approval of the foreign affairs office, the visitors may be received in a low-key manner. Both the duration of the visit and the activities of the visitors are to be curtailed. And in principle, no visits are to be arranged, no banquets, and our side should not be responsible for the visitors’ room and board and other expenses.

2.     The public security and national security department should take measures to keep close track of the uninvited groups or individuals. The hotels, hostels, guest houses, travel agencies and other service departments should work closely together and at the same time ensure the safety of the foreign visitors.

3.     Once the areas or departments receive word that those groups or individuals to be invited are coming ahead of schedule on their own, they should be effectively persuaded not to depart. They should be told: “We have not yet completed the preparations for your reception. Please wait for our formal invitation before departure.”

4.     In case the group to be invited has already arrived, the formalities of invitation should immediately be made up according to procedures. A description of the visiting group, the plan for its reception and the itinerary of its visit should be submitted to the foreign affairs office for approval. The reception should also be low-key.

5.     In their visits abroad or receptions, the various areas and departments should not make commitments in cases where the invitations have not been approved. The formal invitations should be made strictly in accordance with the documents no. 179 (1989) and no. 23 (1991) issued by the office of the people's government of Inner Mongolia. In signing protocols of intention and agreements, the provisions governing personnel exchanges should be strictly adhered to.

Copies for report to: Secretary Wang Qun, Chairman Bu He and Vice-Chairman Zhao Zhihong

Copies for:        Office of the Communist Party Committee of the Autonomous Region, Office of the Government, and Office of the People’s Congress.


Appendix V: Previously Reported Cases of Concern


In May and June 1989, as pan of the nationwide pro-democracy movement, major protest demonstrations occurred in the IMAR. According to an official “internal-use-only” account of the 1989 movement, for example, more than 10,000 students demonstrated in Hohhot on May 22, shouting slogans such as “Support Zhao Ziyang” and “Down with Li Peng.”17 While little is known about the subsequent crackdown and scope of arrests in the region, a number of specific cases were recorded by Asia Watch. According to Inner Mongolia Radio, Yuan Chihe (also known as Tasu). 23, a student at the Baotou Normal College and alleged chief director of the Autonomous Federation of Students from Outside Beijing (AFSOB); Wang Shufeng, 21, a Beijing University student who allegedly helped lead the student hunger strike in Tiananmen Square in mid-May; and Qian Shitun, said to be a “core member” of the AFSOB, were all detained on June 20, 1989 by the public security authorities in Baotou City.18 Nothing has since been heard of the three students, and the Chinese Government failed to account for them in its November 1991 reply to a list of over 800 pro-democracy detainees earlier submitted to Beijing by the U.S. State Department.

Also left unaccounted for by the Chinese Government in that reply were Zhao Guoliang. 22, a self-employed garment vendor from Wuhai City, and a man named Han Yanjun. 24, both of whom were alleged by Inner Mongolia Radio to have been “backbone elements” of the Beijing Dare-to-Die Corps, a spontaneous citizens’ group established in late May 1989 to defend the students in Tiananmen Square.19 According to the news broadcast, the two travelled by train to Chifeng City on June 4, 1989 to “incite rebellion” in schools, and were arrested by the Chifeng Public Security Bureau the following day. Zhao Guoliang was accused of kidnapping two police officers and “storming” the Beijing Public Security Bureau; he was further said to have helped student leader Chai Ling leave Tiananmen Square on the morning of June 4,1989. Han Yanjun, from Dingzhou City in Hebei Province, was accused of “setting up roadblocks and attacking troops in Tiananmen Square” and of subsequently “spreading rumors” that troops had caused bloodshed in the square. Asia Watch is concerned that the person originally reported to be named “Han Yanjun” may in fact be Han Weijun. who was officially reported to have been execured.on March 14, 1991 for allegedly burning an army personnel carrier during the June 1989 crackdown.20 

Other 1989 pro-democracy detainees from the IMAR left unaccounted for in the November 1991 Chinese Government reply include Bao Huilin, Cai Shi, Wen Lihua, Yang Xudong and Zhang Lishan, all reportedly leaders of the Hohhot Workers Autonomous Federation. According to a statement given by the Chinese authorities to the International Labor Organization in October 1990, the five workers had “not been arrested and their cases have not been brought before the judicial authorities.”21 Most probably, however, this formulation means that the five were extra-judicially sentenced to several-year terms of “reeducation through labor” by the public security authorities.


Appendix VI: Labor Camps, Prisons and other Detention Units in Inner Mongolia22


1. Bao'anzhao Labor-Reform Detachment 23

(Neimenggu Bao'anzhao Laogai Zhidui)

[Loc: Jalaid Banner]


2. Baotou Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center 24

(Baotou Shi Laojiaosuo). Product: stone and rock. Also: supplies laborers-to the

Baotou Iron and Steel Mill.

[Loc: Baotou Municipality]


3. Bayannur League Labor-Reform Farm 25

(Bayannao'er Meng Laogai Nongchang)

[Loc: Bayannur League]


4. Bayun E’bo Mining District (certain units only) 26

(Bayun ‘bo Kuang Qu). Product: rare earths)

[Loc: Baotou Municipality]


5. Chifeng Labor-Reform Detachment 27

(Neimenggu Chifeng Laogai Zhidui)

[Loc: in Chifeng City]


6. Chifeng Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center 28

(Chifeng Shi Laojiaosuo). Product: ceramic tile.

[Loc: in Chifeng City]


7. Chifeng New Life Tile Factory 29

( [Chifeng Shi] Xinsheng Zhuan Chang)

[Loc: vicinity ofWusan, to west of Chifeng City]


8. Chifeng Precious Stones Quarry (a subsidiary of the Harqin Banner New Life Precious Stones Mine) 30

(Halaqin Qj. Xinsheng Yingshi Kuang Chifeng Yingshi Chang)

[Loc: eastern suburbs of Chifeng City]


9. Fengzhen Labor-Reeducation Center 31

[Loc: Fengzhen County]


10. Dongtucheng Farm 32

(Neimenggu Laogaiju Dongtucheng Nongchang)

[Loc: Wuyuan County]


11. Hailar Municipal Labor-Reeducation Center 33

(Hailaer Shi Laojiaosuo). Product: red brick.

[Loc: Hailar Municipality]


12. Harqin Banner Precious Stones Mine34

(Halaqin Qt Yingshi Kuang)

[Loc: vicinity of Sishijiazi, southwest of Harqin Town]


13. Hohhot Railways Bureau Remand Center 35

(Hu-Tie-Ju Kanshousuo)

[Loc: east side of Hohhot City]


14. Hohhot Railways Bureau Labor-Reeducation Brigade36

(Hu-Tie-Ju Laojiao Dui)

[Loc: east side of Hohot City]


15. Inner Mongolia Prison 37

[Loc: southern suburbs of Hohhot Municipality]


16. Inner Mongolia Regional Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 Labor-Reform Detachments38

[Loc: unknown]


17. Inner Mongolia Regional No.4 Labor-Reform Detachment39

(Nei Mong Qu Disi Laogai Zhidui)

[Loc: unknown]


18. Inner Mongolia Regional Nos. 6 and 7 Labor-Reform Detachment 40

[Loc: Baotou Municipality]


19. Inner Mongolia Regional Juvenile Offenders Center 41

(Nei Mong Qu Shao-Guan-Suo)

[Loc: probably in Bao*anzhao, Jalaid Banner)


20. Jining Labor-Reeducation Center 42

(Loc: Jining County)



(Nei Meng Laogaiju Lijiata Meikuang)

[Loc: Ih Ju League, northeast of Dongsheng Municipality, in Jungar Banner]


22. Linhe Municipal Detention Center 44

(Linhe Shi Kansfwusuo)

[Loc: northwest pan of Linhe City]


23. New Life Brickyard 45

[Loc: Hohhot Municipality]


24. New Life Machinery Factory 46

[Hohhot Municipality]


25. Tumd Right Banner New Life Coal Mine 47

(Tumote Youqi Xinsheng Meikuang)

[Loc: north ofSaIaqi Town, Tumd Right Banner]


26. Tumd Right Banner New Life Farm 48

(Tumote Youqi Xinsheng Nongchang)

[Loc: east ofSalaqi Town, beside railroad line]


27. Tumuji Labor-Reeducation Center49

[Loc: Ningcheng County]


28. Wuhai Labor-Reeducation Center 50

[Loc: Wuhai Municipality]


29. Wulan Farm 51

(Nei Meng Wulan Nongchang)

[Loc: unknown]


30. Labor-Reform Bureau of the IMAR

[Government body responsible for administration of all prisons, labor-reform camps and juvenile offenders centers in the region.]

Address: Neimenggu Zizhiqu Laogaiju, Huhehaoteshi Tongdaobeijie 4 Hao.

Tel: [Hohhot] 35684.

Bureau Director: Liu Shujing,

Bureau Deputy-Directors: Su Shusen, Zhao Renqin, Cheng Fuming.52





Errata for Crackdown in Inner Mongolia

(Asia Watch July 1991)


1) On “the military suppression, known as the ‘February counter-current’” (p.4): these were actually two different events. The “February counter-current” was a military crackdown on anti-Ulanhu Red Guards carried out by some of Ulanhu’s old military associates, including Kong Fei, Tala and Ting Miao. This crackdown then prompted Beijing to send in non-Inner Mongolian troops, led by Teng Haiqing, to thoroughly purge the Inner Mongolian leadership; this latter was in fact the “military suppression” referred to above.

2) The name “Ulanhu” does not (as was stated on p.4) mean “Red Sun,” but rather, “Red Son.”

3) “B.Bagbar” (p. 8) should read “Baabar”; this is a pseudonym for B. Bat-Bayar, president of the opposition Social Democratic Party in the former MPR.

4) “Tsedenbar” (p.9) should read “Tsedenbal.”

5) “Cholbasan” (p.9) should read “Choibalsan.”

6) Xi Haiming’s hometown is Naiman Banner, and not (as was stated on p.16) “Senaiman” Banner.




1.       The groups' activities consisted mainly of holding study meetings in members' homes, reprinting and circulating academic papers on Mongol history, and formulating peaceful strategies for the social and political advancement of China's ethnic Mongolians.

2.       Wang's Mongolian clan name is Uigurjin. In the late 1980s, Wang did research at the Inner Mongolia Normal University, gaining an MA. degree on the topic of symbolism in Mongolian epic literature. He has a wife and three-year-old daughter.

3.       The 26 persons placed under house arrest were all members of the IhJu group's Provisional Council. The list of names, together with brief biographical information, can be found in Crackdown in Inner Mongolia (Asia Watch, July 1991), pp.22-26.

4.       Inner Mongolia is subdivided into eight large areas known as “leagues” (meng), 51 smaller “banners” (qi) and numerous basic-level units known as sumu. This administrative system was first introduced into the region during the Manchu Qing Dynasty. Ih Ju League occupies most of the large plain (pan desert, part arid grassland) enclosed within the great north-east-southward bend in the Yellow River, an ancient heartland of Mongolian culture traditionally known as the Ordos- The adjacent Bayannur League occupies the large, partly mountainous territory lying along the northern bank of the river at the uppermost point on this bend. The population of the IMAR is about 21 million, with Mongolians being outnumbered by Han Chinese by a factor of around six to one.

5.       In October 1991, a correspondent from Radio France Internationale was told by dissident Inner Mongolian sources in Ulan Bator that the IMAR authorities would soon be carrying out a wave of up to 400 arrests in the region. (RFI, “Vague de Repression en Mongolie Interieure.” broadcast October 16, 1991.) The main target would be an official body, based in Hohhot but with sizeable branches in Xilin Gol League and Jirem League, called the Inner Mongolian Youth Association for the Study of Mongol Culture: around 300 members of this organization were reportedly slated for arrest. In addition, around 100 members of three previously unknown underground dissident groups in the region, known variously as the Inner Mongolian Human Rights Protection League (Neinunggu Renquan Baohu Tongiwng: the Chinese name is different from the human rights group cited above), the Inner Mongolian National Liberation Front (Neimenggu Mimu Jiefang Zhenxian) and the Inner Mongolian Front for Democracy (Neimenggu MimAu Zhenxian), were also reportedly slated as targets in the crackdown. Asia Watch cannot confirm whether the arrests actually took place.

6.       In Human Rights Watch’s World Report 1992, p.266, Bayantogtokh's name was incorrectly transliterated as “Baoyintaoktao.”

7.       The name in Chinese is Wulan Sabu, which could also be transliterated as “Ulaan Shiivuu,” “Ulaan Chuluu” or even “Ulaan Sambuu.”

8.       “A warning to reporters who tell China’s secrets,” South China Morning Post, September 16, 1991.

9.      Neimeng Liu Cheng’Dongluan’Nao Duti,” (“ ‘Turmoil’ Occurs in Six Inner Mongolian Cities in Support of Independence” ), Dongxiang, No.1-2, 1992, pp.17.18. Dongxiang is the sister journal of Zheng Ming (“Contention.”) 

10.   “Be Geared to the Future, Accelerate the Development of Areas Inhabited by National Minorities,” People's Daily, January 12, 1992.

11.   Reuters, October 25, 1991; in South China Morning Post (“Mongolians in protest to Li”), October 26, 1991.

12.   In January 1992, the Hural, parliament of the State of Mongolia, ratified a new constitution guaranteeing multi-party democracy. General elections were scheduled to be held in June 1992, with presidential elections following one year later. The previously two-chambered Hural was merged into a single chamber with 76 representatives in all. The former Communist Party still dominates the Hural, but it has split to produce a new social-democratic opposition party called the Mongolian Renaissance Party. Previously, the largest opposition party was the Democratic Party.

13.   This document was cited in Crackdown in Inner Mongolia (Asia Watch, July 1991) as “An Open Letter to Mr. ‘Man’.” The document apparently refers to the protagonist of a long poem entitled “Man,” written by the MPR author R. Choinom. Imprisoned in the early 1960s for his outspoken criticisms of the MPR government, Choinom died in jail, but his poetry became the symbol of the 1990 democracy movement in the MPR- His poem "Man" was finally published there on May 25, 1990.

14.   The 37-page text of this dialogue appears in a paper delivered by Professor Gyorgy Kara, of the Uralic and Altaic Department of Indiana University, to the Midwest Conference of Asian Studies at Indiana University in November 1990. Professor Gyorgy's paper also includes bis discussion of a 55-page pamphlet of articles by B. Bat-Bayar, president of the opposition Social Democratic Party in the former MPR, as referred to in Asia Watch's previous report on Inner Mongolia (see item 3 of ERRATA for Crackdown in Inner Mongolia, below.)

15.   The reference is to Isa YusufAlptekin, elderly exiled leader of the Uighur nationalists. He now lives in Ankara, Turkey, and is one of the organizers of Common Voice, a dissident Chinese ethnic Journal published by a coalition named the “Allied Committee of the People of Eastern Turkestan, Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet Presently Under China.” See also Crackdown in Inner Mongolia (Asia Watch, July 1991), p. 6 and p. 12.

16.   See “Causes of Ethnic Riots Viewed,” FBIS. April 30, 1990. According to an April 24. 1990 article in the Hong Kong Tang Tai, riots in Urumqi on May 19. 1989 were due to “the publication of a book, ‘Sexual Habits,’ on the mainland, which explains Muslim mosque buildings and decorations in terms of sex and was regarded by Muslims as a serious blasphemy to Islam.”

17.  Jingxin Dongpo de 56 Tian (“Fifty-Six Soul Stirring Days”), State Education Commission (Beijing, August 1989), p. 159.

18.  Inner Mongolia Radio broadcast, June 23, 1989; in FBIS. June 27.

19.  Inner Mongolia Radio broadcast, in FBIS. June 19, 1989.

20.   South China Morning Post, March 19, 1991.

21.   See: Hearings of the International Labor Organization Committee on Freedom of Association (November 2 990): Case No.1500. Complaint Against the Government of China Presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

22.   This list is not exhaustive. Large areas of Inner Mongolia are closed to access by foreigners, and it is particularly difficult to compile information on labor camps and other detention facilities in the region.


Source references in the footnotes denote the following:


LLLJ:      Laogai Laojiao IMun Yanjiu (“Theoretical Studies in Labor-Reform and Labor- Reeducation”), a restricted-circulation bimonthly journal.

FYGY:     Fanmi Yu Gaizao Yanjiu ("Research on Crime and Reform"), a restricted-circulation bimonthly journal.

ZIP:       Neimenggu. Zishiqu Youzheng Bianma Tuji (“Zipcode Atlas for the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region”).

SFXZ:     Sift Xingzheng (“Judicial Administration”), a monthly journal published by the Ministry of Justice.

WU:       Lists of labor-reform camps, prisons and other detention units compiled by Harry Wu, and cited with permission from his forthcoming book : Laogai: The Chinese Gulag (Wescview Press, 1992.)

23.   FYGY, Feb.89, p. 18; ZIP, p.70.

24.   LLLY, Apr.89, p.44.

25.   ZIP, p.I45(i) and p.147. This unit seems to be the same as that listed by WU as “Langshan Labor-Reform Detachment” and “Xinhua Farm”. NB: Neimenggu Fengqing (“Inner Mongolian Splendor”; hereinafter NMGFQ), People’s Daily Press, 1987, p.50, identifies the Langshan area - where Bayannur League Labor-Reform Farm lies - as having among the richest deposits of sulphur-iron ore in the country. Prisoners are used for sulphur-iron mining elsewhere in China, notably in Guangdong Province.

26.   ZIP, p. 114; and WU. Baiyun E’bo Mining District is a remote administrative annex of Baotou Municipality, located about 100 km. due north of the municipality proper. The district is in effect an industrial subsidiary of the Baotou Iron and Steel Mill, a huge corporation whose main sites are located in and around Baotou City; it takes its name from an adjacent Mongolian township named Bayin Aobao. (See also Item 2, above.)

27.   LLLY, Oct.89, p.53; ZIP, p.30(i).

28.   LLLY, Apr.89, p.44; ZIP, p-30.

29.   ZIP, p.32.

30.   ZIP, p-30 (v). In addition, ZIP lists the following subsidiary unit of the Harqin mine: Chifeng Purchasing Group of the Harqin Banner New life Precious Stones Mine (Ha-Qj. Xinsheng Ymgshikuang Zhu Chifeng Caigouzu) [location: Chifeng City; ZIP, p.30]. NB: Directly below this entry (location Chifeng) is listed; “Ha-Qi Yingshikuang Zhuwiu” - indicating that the Harqin New Life Precious Stones Mine is not necessarily the same unit as the Harqin Precious Stones Mine, as listed in ZIP, p-46. The former is probably a subsidiary of the latter, but may be located elsewhere in Harqin Banner. See Item 12. below.

31.   WU.

32.   ZIP, p-155. NB: A separate unit, “Dongtucheng Farm” (without the “Labor-reform Bureau” prefix) is located slightly to the southwcst. Also, there is another “Dongtucheng” (a town, same characters) in Wuchuan County [ZIP, p.121.]

33.   LLLY, Apr.89, p.44.

34.   ZIP, p.46; sec also p.30 (v). It is likely that only certain pans of this enterprise use prison labor: see Footnote 25.

35.   ZIP, p.8 (in). There are many other local-level detention and remand centers in Inner Mongolia. The ones listed here are only those known to Asia Watch. NB: Also listed for Hohhot is: Inner Mongolia Labor-Reform Bureau Hospital (Neimenggu Laogaiju Yvyuan) [ZIP, p.8 (iii).]

36.   ZIP, p-8 (iii).

37.   WU.

38.   WU.

39.   LLLY, Oct.90. p.56.

40.   WU.

41.   LLLY, Aug.90, p.35. WU also lists a Juvenile Offenders Detention Center, location Bao’anzhao; but it is not certain that this is the same as that listed in LLLY.

42.   WU.

43.   SFXZ, Jan.91, p.33; ZIP, p.135. According to NMGFQ (p.42). Inner Mongolia contains 1/3 of China’s total coal reserves (second only to Shanxi Province); ranked first among the region’s top 15 coalfields is Ih Ju League's Jungar Opencast Coalfield. In his 4/25/91 annual Inner Mongolia Government Work Report (text in NeimengguRihao, 5/9/91), Bu He, chairman of the regional government, described “the Jungar...large coal and electricity joint production project” as being an important pan of the national 8th Five Year Plan and “one of the key energy projects of the state.” ZIP, p.135 shows Lijiata's precise location within the Ih Ju League.

44.   ZIP, p. 145.

45.   WU.

46.   WU.

47.   ZIP, p.23.

48.   ZIP, p.23.

49.   wu.

50.   wu.

51.   SFXZ.Sep.Ql.p.aS.

52.   Zhonggw ZhengfuJigou Minglu, 1989: Xia Juan (“Directory of Government Organs, 1989: Vol.2”), Xinhua Publishing House. August 1989, p.79.




From Yeke-juu League to Ordos Municipality: settler colonialism and alter/native urbanization in Inner Mongolia

Close to Eden (Urga): France, Soviet Union, directed by Nikita Mikhilkov

Beyond Great WallsBeyond Great Walls: Environment, Identity, and Development on the Chinese Grasslands of Inner Mongolia

The Mongols at China's EdgeThe Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity

China's Pastoral RegionChina's Pastoral Region: Sheep and Wool, Minority Nationalities, Rangeland Degradation and Sustainable Development

Changing Inner MongoliaChanging Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State (Oxford Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology)

Grasslands and Grassland Science in Northern ChinaGrasslands and Grassland Science in Northern China: A Report of the Committee on Scholarly Communication With the People's Republic of China

The Ordos Plateau of ChinaThe Ordos Plateau of China: An Endangered Environment (Unu Studies on Critical Environmental Regions)
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